

## **Recent Developments in Mobility Policy and Research in the UK**

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### **1. Introduction**

Since the mid-nineties, there has been a significant shift in UK transport policy (begun under the previous Conservative government and extended under the present Labour government), which has also had major implications for research programmes and research priorities. In many cases, these developments can be linked to important shifts in public attitudes, and in research findings.

The paper first provides a brief historical context (section 2), next outlines a number of key policy initiatives (section 3), and discusses how these have been linked with certain methodological developments (section 4). Parallel developments in UK transport research are discussed in section 5. The paper concludes (section 6) with an indication of likely future directions in research and policy.

### **Background**

During most of the last two decades, the main thrust of UK transport policy has been to open up transport markets to competition, through a process of privatisation and deregulation. In terms of land transport, this was applied first to the long distance domestic coach market, then the local (urban and rural) bus market, and most recently to the railway network. Steps were also taken to detach the strategic road network from day-to-day government control, by taking it from the Ministry of Transport and setting up - at 'arms length' - the Highways Agency. As the government divested itself of direct responsibility for transport operations, there was also an assumption that the liberalised sectors would become more responsible for identifying and funding their own research and marketing needs. In general, it was felt that 'things were best left to the market', with the government retaining a limited regulatory function to ensure safety standards, etc.<sup>1</sup>

Such developments were undoubtedly successful in most cases in driving down costs - which, behind the political rhetoric of better services, was one of the prime reasons for the policy (i.e. to remove or reduce government subsidy). However, over the period that such changes were implemented, we can observe a gradual, but significant shift in attitude under successive Conservative administrations towards the role that government should play in the transport sector - linked with changes in public attitudes.

In the main, all the privatisation and deregulation policies were promoted in the name of 'consumer choice', but there have been discernible shifts in the meaning of the word 'choice' over time. At first, government action was explained as promoting choice by giving the market free reign to meet consumer needs, with a view that if only government interference could be minimised, then the market would naturally satisfy demand.

Subsequently, however, the limitations in practice of this philosophy became apparent. The privatised bus industry reduced service levels outside the working day, and put up fares in the conurbations; there were many examples of 'wasteful competition' and resulting serious road congestion. It soon became apparent that a range of transport

providers (within and across sectors), each looking after their own company's interests, were unlikely to collectively produce a transport system that best met society's needs.

In some cases where they did try – by co-ordinating bus service timetables or offering interchangeable ticketing – the companies came up against competition law, which branded some of these activities as 'anti-competitive'.

Given this reality, the government redefined its role as being there to ensure that a choice of mode was provided (e.g. that people had the choice of not having to drive everywhere). It did this by encouraging conditions that promoted transport choices, through a combination of regulation and subsidy. The issue was most apparent in urban areas, where the free-for-all following bus deregulation had not led to an efficient use of the road network, and in some cities rail services were being undermined by bus competition, while clearly offering an important element of congestion relief, in the broader policy context.

Part of the solution was to recognise the link between planning decisions and transport choices, by encouraging new land use developments in areas more accessible to public transport. Though words such as 'integration' remained taboo.

Despite these ad hoc adjustments to transport policy, however, there was a general concern that the government did not have an overall transport strategy. A rapid growth in economic activity and traffic levels during the late-eighties led to sharp increases in congestion, and a concern across a wide spectrum of interests groups (from business leaders to environmental groups) that a co-ordinated policy was required. The government's response was to announce a 'great transport debate', in which the various parties were encouraged to reach a common agreement on what should be done – only then was the government prepared to act.

Over the same period, public opinion surveys showed a growing level of concern about the contribution of road traffic to congestion and air pollution, and support for a move away from car-oriented policies. There was declining support for major new road building, and a shift in favour of urban policies that restrained car use and improved modal alternatives (Park and Ride, bus priority, light rail schemes, better walking and cycling provision, etc. Concern was also growing over the effects of global warming.

By the mid/late nineties, the national government had reacted to these various concerns in several ways:

- by promoting planning policies which encouraged the siting of new development in areas accessible by non-car modes (Planning Policy Guidance Note 13: Transport);
- by introducing air quality legislation that required local authorities to tackle excessive pollution levels (including restrictions on road traffic);
- by increasing fuel duty by 5% per annum in real terms, to encourage more fuel efficient transport and so reduce global warming; and
- by facilitating the passage of two short Traffic Reduction Acts, which required local authorities to take action where (existing or projected) traffic levels gave rise to unacceptable levels of traffic congestion, poor air quality, etc. and to report annually on the situation.

It had also begun to tackle the particular problem of road safety by setting targets for accident reduction, and encouraging all professionals with an interest in the area to work together to achieve them.

The election of a new Labour government in 1997 accelerated and consolidated these shifts in policy emphasis.

### **3. Recent Policy Developments**

For several decades, national politicians had seen transport as a secondary priority, in the main with the Ministry peopled by politicians on their way up, or on their way down the political ladder– there was a very high turnover rate. With the election of the new Labour government in May 1997, the Deputy Prime Minister took control of transport, which was combined with environment and local government into a 'super ministry' called the

Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR). Transport now had a heavy weight voice in government, and was much more closely integrated with environment and planning issues.

The problems facing the incoming government included the lack of a co-ordinated, strategic policy for transport and a legacy of decades in under-investment in transport across all land-based modes, both in terms of maintenance and new infrastructure.

## 1. Transport white paper

In July 1998 the government published the first Transport White Paper in over twenty years: “A New Deal for Transport: Better for Everyone”. In the ministerial Forward, the document acknowledges the evolutionary origins of the Paper:

*“There is now a consensus for radical change in transport policy. The previous Government’s Green Paper paved the way with recognition that we needed to improve public transport and reduce dependence on the car. Businesses, unions, environmental organisations and individuals throughout Britain share that analysis.”*

The White Paper included a number of important initiatives:

- Set of clear policy objectives, to guide national and local plans;
- Requirement for all highway authorities to produce five-year Local Transport Plans, in order to gain funding for capital projects;
- Development of Regional Transport Strategies, linked to regional development plans, as a framework for local investment decisions;
- The establishment of the Commission for Integrated Transport, composed of stakeholder groups, to provide recommendations to government on current issues and to monitor government progress in meeting its targets;
- The setting up of the Strategic Rail Authority, to provide a strategic policy framework for future government investment in the rail sector, and to help facilitate the better integration of the fragmented privatised industry.
- Commissioning of multi-modal studies on a number of major movement corridors (in place of simple, road capacity studies)
- Encouragement of ‘quality partnerships’ between local authorities and the private sector in relation to bus travel and freight movements, with public sector infrastructure funding (e.g. bus priority measures, bus shelters) in exchange for guaranteed service provision.

It also promised a series of ‘daughter documents’ that would set out policy in a number of specific areas in more detail. These included bus policy, charging for the use of roads (congestion charging and the workplace parking levy), and sustainable distribution.

The general emphasis was on promoting ‘sustainable transport’ through the encouragement of integrated transport systems and policies. Integration was stressed at a number of levels: between different types of transport, with the environment, with land use planning, and with policies for education, health and wealth creation.

## 2. Local transport plans

Since the privatisation of the various sectors of the transport industry, the government has very little direct, operational control over policy implementation (except in relation to the strategic road network). It relies very heavily on local highway authorities to implement policy, at sub-regional and local levels. Until the recent changes, authorities could make annual bids for funding for capital projects by submitting a Transport Policies and

Programme (TPP) document. However, the process was optional, tended to concentrate on road schemes, and did not tackle problems in an integrated fashion.

The introduction of Local Transport Plans has changed this approach in a number of ways<sup>2</sup>:

- They are compulsory – giving them greater weight within local authorities;
- They set out a five-year programme of co-ordinated, integrated action, against a set of clear objectives;
- They represent a strategic planning document as much as a bidding document;
- They take into account both capital and revenue expenditure;
- They are based on partnerships, involving operators and various user and environmental groups;
- There is an emphasis on consultation;
- There is an emphasis on targets and performance indicators.

Following the passage of Acts providing for differing degrees of devolution for Scotland and Wales, and the creation of the Greater London Authority, the LTPs only operate in England outside London<sup>3</sup>.

Each LTP contains five key elements:

1. Clear statement of objectives, taking account of local priorities but in the context of five core national objectives:
  - to improve safety
  - to promote accessibility
  - to contribute to an efficient economy
  - to promote integration
  - to protect the environment
2. An analysis of local problems and opportunities
3. A long-term strategy to tackle the problems and to deliver the LTP objectives
4. A costed and affordable five-year implementation programme of schemes and policy measures
5. A set of targets and performance indicators and other outputs, to assess whether the plan is delivering its objectives

It also needs to demonstrate that the Plan has been developed with the involvement of local stakeholder groups, and that there is in place a programme of monitoring to assess the effectiveness of the measures that are implemented under the LTP.

### **3. Funding for transport improvements**

One of the major stumbling blocks to increased funding for transport was the strong resistance of the Treasury to ‘hypothecating’ transport taxes and other income for transport expenditure - even though the government’s income from the transport sector was rising sharply. Over a period of three years of intense negotiation between DETR and the Treasury, several important concessions were won (but in some respects – see section 3.5 below – too late to prevent a backlash against the high tax take/low spend historical situation). In particular, it was agreed that:

- Declining subsidy payments to the rail operators under their franchise agreements would be ploughed back into investment in the industry, not absorbed by the Treasury;
- Proceeds from local congestion charging or workplace parking schemes would be retained by the local authority to spend on local transport initiatives for the first ten years of operation<sup>4</sup>;
- Any increase in annual fuel duty, above the rate of inflation, would be hypothecated for transport investment.

### **4. The national ten-year transport plan**

Setting up new administrative procedures and frameworks inevitably took a considerable time, and after three years of the new government there were growing concerns that the government's statements about the need for a new transport policy were not being matched by improvements on the ground. Increases in investment were slow – largely because the in-coming Labour government, concerned at the charge before the election that they would substantially increase taxation and public spending, announced that they would stick to the Conservative public expenditure forecasts for their first two years.

In July 2000, the government published “Transport 2010: the 10 year plan”, which set out a £180bn investment package to deal with the backlog in transport provision, funded through a mixture of private and public sector investment. This is a 75% increase in real terms, compared to the preceding decade.

The stated vision behind the Plan is for “a modern, safe, high quality network that better meets people's needs and offers more choice to individuals, families, communities and businesses.” By 2010 the aim is to have a transport system that provides:

- Modern, high quality public transport, both locally and nationally – providing increased choice.
- More light rail systems and fully accessible bus services.
- High quality Park and Ride systems around many more towns and cities
- Modern train fleet, faster, more frequent and more reliable
- Well maintained road network with real-time driver information
- Fully integrated public transport information, booking and ticketing systems
- Safer and more secure transport
- A transport system that makes less impact on the environment.

In broad terms, the investment would be equally split between:

- Rail investment (£60bn) designed to cater for an increase in passenger numbers of 50% and a growth in rail freight of 80% in ten years.
- New road investment of £59bn, to widen 360 miles of motorways and trunk roads, build local by-passes, relieve local bottlenecks – with the aim of reducing current levels of congestion, despite a projected growth in road traffic levels and a forecast 15% increase in congestion.
- Local transport spending (on road maintenance, light rail schemes, improved bus services, better provision for walking and cycling), also at £59bn. Targets here include increasing bus passengers by 10% by 2010 (against a trend in a decline in numbers), and a trebling in the number of cycling trips.

The Plan incorporates targets set by government, in relation to cycling and to accident reduction. In the latter case, the new road safety targets for the year 2010 are based on reducing the number of accidents relative to a baseline of average annual accidents reported between 1994 and 1998:

- A 40% reduction in the numbers killed or seriously injured in road accidents
- In the case of children, this target reduction is increased to 50%
- A 10% reduction in the slight casualty rate.

After four years of the labour government, increased investment is finally beginning to work its way through the system, but skill shortages – due to years of neglect of transport expenditure – are resulting in severe staff shortages in some areas, making it difficult for authorities to spend their increased budgets.

## 5. Other important factors

Public and business opinion was a key factor behind the gradual shift in policy among successive governments, to the point that the incoming Labour government was able to promote a 'pro public transport' policy with a broad degree of support.

During the eighties and most of the nineties, concerns about air quality and traffic congestion increased – even during a period of recession, when environmental concerns might have been expected to have declined. The policy vacuum that had existed during much of the nineties had also had the beneficial effect of bringing together the various stakeholder groups, and encouraging them to take the lead and reach a consensus on the key issues and necessary actions.

However, subsequent events have led to the government being characterised as being 'anti-car' and these have resulted in a degree of panic and a subsequent retrenchment in the types of policy measures advocated.

The incoming Labour administration continued the policy of real increases in annual fuel duty established by its predecessor, but increased the rate from 5% to 6%. Cumulatively, this was resulting in a large differential between UK rates and those of most other European countries, and industry in particular was beginning to complain of a competitive disadvantage. The fuel protests of autumn 2000 that began in France soon spread to the UK (with the blocking of the main oil refineries) and led to severe fuel shortages in less than a week. Effective direct action of this nature is quite unusual in the UK, and shortly afterwards the fuel duty escalator was abandoned.

The government had also announced a series of technology trials for electronic motorway tolling, and Parliament passed legislation allowing English local authorities to introduce congestion charging or workplace parking levies – as noted, using the net revenues (for the first ten years) to fund local transport improvements. Local authority support for such measures was initially quite high, but has since dropped. This is partly because of local political fears over the introduction of such measures and partly because the high-profile announcement of a large increase in transport expenditure under the 10-year plan reduced the imperative to find additional local funding sources<sup>5</sup>.

The impression of an 'anti-car' stance by the government (high fuel duty, congestion charging, etc.) was made much worse by the perceived failure of its 'pro public transport' policies – the alternatives did not seem to be working. This was in part due to the delay in increasing levels of investment, as previously noted, but also reflected a perceived failure of the bus and rail industry to improve service quality. There was much publicity, for example, surrounding the failure of the train operators to meet their reliability and punctuality targets (largely due to increases in train services on the network).

On the rail side, government plans for expansion received a severe setback following a series of major rail accidents (Southall, Hatfield, and Selby). This dented the perceived safety record of the industry, but even worse it disclosed the appalling state of repair of the rail infrastructure and the inability of Railtrack to manage its assets – or raise significant private investment. As one observer recently commented: 'the UK rail industry has suffered a nervous breakdown'.

The combined effect of these various factors has been to blow the government's transport strategy off course, with the result that nationally there is now a high level of political sensitivity to upsetting the motoring lobby. It is at the local level where more 'radical' transport policy pronouncements are now to be found (e.g. the Mayor's proposals for Congestion Charging in London). Recently the national government has announced a series of new road schemes - in several cases ahead of the publication of the findings of multi-modal studies for those corridors - in an effort to be seen to be meeting the needs of motorists.

#### **4. Parallel Methodological Developments**

Several of these developments in transport policy have been mirrored by changes in transport planning methodology, in some cases with the methodology forcing policy change and in other cases responding to the needs of the new policy agenda. Three examples are provided here:

- The link between road capacity and demand
- The switch from trip-based to tour-based modelling
- The widening of appraisal, from cost benefit to a multi-criteria approach

### 1. Road capacity and demand

Early transport planning modellers had recognised in the sixties that increasing road capacity could induce traffic growth, but for simplicity they had developed traffic assignment models that did not take this into account and used a fixed trip origin-destination matrix as an input. Over time, this became both the conceptual and methodological orthodoxy and the logic of the argument was reversed: new road capacity does not generate traffic, because the models do not forecast any generated traffic.

The public well understood that this is not always the case. Building the M25 orbital motorway around London, for example, was generally acknowledged among non-professionals to have generated extra car traffic. However, it took nearly a decade of studies to change the official government position, and to acknowledge that – in areas of suppressed demand – extra capacity can generate additional ‘induced’ car traffic (SACTRA, 1994). One study in London, for example, showed that traffic had increased 50% above that on comparable corridors, by significantly increasing road capacity.

Later studies showed that the converse could also apply: that removing traffic capacity can lead to a reduction in traffic levels (Cairns, Hass-Klau and Goodwin, 1998). This finding is clearly not a surprise to an economist (for whom demand is usually affected by the level and quality of supply), but it did require a change in perspective for many traffic engineers, who had viewed traffic levels as a given not a policy variable. The resulting modifications to traffic models are still in the process of being implemented.

In policy terms, the effect of the findings of this research was two-fold. First, a recognition that the benefits of road investment may be overstated in areas with a high level of suppressed demand. Second, some reduction in the level of concern about the potential consequences of reducing traffic capacity, by re-allocating it to other road user groups.

### 2. Introduction of tour-based transport models

Despite the adoption of tour-based forecasting models in the Netherlands and some other European countries more than a decade ago, most UK travel demand modelling has remained firmly trip-based (and often quite aggregate in nature).

This is really a historical anomaly, arising from the fact that the person trip-based models had been developed from their vehicle-based predecessors, in which context single vehicle trips did provide a logical unit of analysis. However, it is evident that car/non-car mode choices are generally based on decisions about the whole home-based tour, not just the trip, so any modelling system developed from scratch for this purpose would find it difficult to justify a trip-based unit of analysis.

One consequence of this mis-specification may have been an over-estimation of the ability of improved bus services to attract car driver trips, thereby resulting in misleading policy advice. Most operational mode choice models were calibrated on morning peak conditions, when buses are given priority and are at their most competitive, and did not take any account of the possibly less favourable conditions on the return journey.

It has only been with the advent of serious interest in urban congestion charging (in cases where charging is area-based or involves both inbound and outbound cordon charging) that modellers have been forced to develop tour-based models, and to incorporate a well designed trip re-timing sub-model into the forecasting suite. This has been necessary in order to examine how motorists decisions about whether or when to drive would be affected by variations in charging levels, charging time periods, etc.

### 3. The widening base of appraisal

For several decades, cost-benefit analysis has dominated the appraisal of major road investment schemes in the UK, with financial analysis playing a stronger role in the case of major public transport (rail) schemes, where many of the service benefits can – in principle – be directly recouped through higher fares.

During the 1990s increasing concerns about appraisal and the resulting investment decisions were being expressed on two fronts:

- i. Over the incompatibility between road and rail appraisals, with an inherent tendency to favour road schemes (where all time savings were counted<sup>6</sup>), compared to rail (where operators were expected to capture – a portion of – these savings, as best they could).
- ii. That CBA could not adequately take into account the increasing diversity of government transport policy objectives – or indeed deal explicitly with competing objectives in a ‘non-compensatory’ manner.

Aspects of the latter problem initially arose in relation to environmental impacts, where many aspects could not be adequately monetarised. However, as policy ambitions grew, so did the scale of the problem: how to include economic regeneration, social inclusion, etc into the appraisal. And, how to ensure that – in the ‘netting out’ of gainers and losers in the cost-benefit summation of discounted net benefits – some key policy objectives were not being sacrificed at the expense of others.<sup>7</sup> It is also difficult to explicitly include targets in a CBA.

As a consequence, the government has now adopted a multi-criteria-type appraisal framework, based around its five key policy objectives (see section 3.2), that sets out impacts in their own ‘natural’ units of measurement. Cost benefit ratios are still calculated for major investments, but only form one aspect of the information used to reach the decision. In the last few years, the method has broadened from one designed to appraise road schemes, into a fully-fledged multi-modal appraisal tool, GOMMMS – the Guidance on Methodology for Multi-Modal Studies (DETR, 2000c).

## 5. Research Developments

Interest in both transport research and consultancy has grown rapidly in recent years, following a period of relative stagnation during the eighties and much of the nineties. This increased interest rose initially with the need for government to obtain better data and techniques to back up its policy making, and then to assist local authorities and others in implementing these policies.

Aside from university funding from Research Councils, most UK transport research relating to policy concepts or methodological issues is funded by central government or through European Commission RTD programmes; relatively little is funded by charities or industry. During the eighties, when there was a strong emphasis on market deregulation and privatisation, EC funded research was an important means of supporting new methodological research and for pump-priming UK demonstrations (e.g. the transport telematics ROMANSE trials in Southampton). Work on the impacts of deregulation was in the main funded by Research Councils. During that period, central government research focused on the road safety and traffic management areas.

By the nineties, there was a growing interest within government about user needs, and the impacts of policy initiatives. This led to a spate of studies into public attitudes to aspects of transport policy, and to performance monitoring of public and private sector initiatives. Demonstration projects were initiated, to show how communities could benefit from road by-passes, if measures were taken to traffic calm the relieved areas; area-wide safety schemes were also implemented. The growth in interest in road user charging also led to efforts to improve forecasting procedures.

With the advent of the Labour government in 1997, the research agenda has shifted and broadened to assist in delivering the new transport agenda. Considerable effort has gone into improving appraisal techniques, and there is a greater interest in attitudinal and behavioural research. For example, to understand why people drive, and what improvements would be needed to encourage modal shift.



In the area of local and regional transport, for example, current research studies funded by DETR cover areas such as:

- Parking demand, supply and enforcement;
- Effectiveness of cycling, walking and traffic calming initiatives;
- Traffic signals and urban traffic control systems;
- Network management, environment and safety;
- Bus service performance;
- Travel behaviour, surveys and policy assessment;
- Public attitudes, transport plans and travel awareness;
- Traveller information systems and traffic signing;
- Mobility and social policy;
- Appraisal of trunk road schemes, and
- Road user charging and associated technology.

There has been a large increase in the number of Best Practice Guides that have been published, advising local authorities on a whole range of issues. These include: how to develop Local Transport Plans, to implement site Travel Plans, Safe Routes to School initiatives, traffic calming measures, awareness campaigns, bus priorities, pedestrian-friendly schemes, cycling initiatives, etc.

There have also been attempts to encourage co-operation between academics, industry and local authorities, through initiatives such as the LINK programme, with joint funding from central government and appropriate Research Councils. In the case of transport, the emphasis of the programme during the nineties has switched from engineering research to a much greater interest in behavioural and policy research.

There is a reasonable degree of specialisation between the main university transport research groups in the UK, most of whom also run transport Masters courses. A useful summary of current British and Irish academic research is published every year as a supplement with the journal *Traffic Engineering and Control* (contact [c.debell@hemming-group.co.uk](mailto:c.debell@hemming-group.co.uk)). The latest, 2000 edition runs to 64 pages.

#### 4. **Likely Future Directions**

In March 2001, the government published a consultation document setting out a draft strategy for DETR Integrated Transport Research, designed to assist in the delivery of the 10-year plan. This would bring all DETR-funded research under the central control of a new Transport Research Unit, replacing the previously fragmented approach.

Thirteen priority areas are identified, covering:

- Reducing congestion
- Reducing the impact of transport on the environment
- Improving safety
- Improving and modernising public transport
- Promoting walking, cycling and public transport
- Promoting socially inclusive and accessible transport
- Managing the asset
- Technology, innovation and futures
- Modelling and analysis
- Behaviour and attitudes
- Land use planning
- International experience, and
- Evaluation

The consultation document notes, in particular, that:

*“There should be a greater emphasis than previously on **social science** research and research on the attitudes of and factors influencing the behaviour of ‘end users’ of transport. We need to develop a better understanding of how transport impacts on different groups in society. Research should explore the linkages with wider policy areas, including the need to address social exclusion and access problems (particularly in rural areas).”*

Throughout government there is a strong emphasis on ‘evidenced-based’ research, and so monitoring and assessment of policy initiatives is an important feature of the programme. In relation to transport, there is still a need for considerable research, both to develop methods for monitoring and identifying policy impacts, in a cost effective manner, and to advise on new policy measures and delivery mechanisms.

In general, there is now a much greater emphasis on the need for innovation in order to tackle deep-seated transport problems, and to view transport in its wider social and economic context. As part of this shift in priorities, efforts are being made both by government departments and the Research Councils to encourage broader research partnerships, involving academics, practitioners and user groups, and the public and private sectors.

After nearly a decade of transport policy development, we are likely to witness a less active period of policy making, as the emphasis switches to implementation. However, the extent to which government needs to exercise control over privatised industries is likely to remain a contentious issue, as is the extent to which government can encourage less reliance on car travel without being branded ‘anti-car’.

Transport research funding is likely to remain strong for the foreseeable future, with a greater diversity of topics than in the past, and with a stronger cross-disciplinary and cross-sector emphasis than hitherto.

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All DETR documents are available on the website: [www.detr.gov.uk](http://www.detr.gov.uk)

<sup>1</sup> Bob Kiley, the recently appointed Transport Commissioner for London, who was brought over from New York, has commented on his surprise at the still prevailing attitude in central government that public sector provision is second best.

<sup>2</sup> During the nineteen nineties some metropolitan authorities began to change the nature of the TPP by submitting a 'package' of measures for funding, comprising both roads and public transport schemes.

<sup>3</sup> Scottish authorities are required to produce Local Transport Strategies, while in London the 33 Boroughs produce Local Implementation Plans in conformity with the Mayor's London-wide Transport Strategy.

<sup>4</sup> From a Treasury perspective, the ten year period was viewed as a major concession; but from the business and public perspectives, the 10 year limit was seen as an admission that it was really just another tax that would get absorbed in general government revenue, in time. The Scottish Act has no such time limit (but does not allow for the introduction of a workplace parking level, following pressure from businesses).

<sup>5</sup> The 'small print' in the 10 Year Plan says that part of the income for investment would come from local congestion charging and workplace parking schemes, but politically the government has played this down, with no public pronouncements to this effect.

<sup>6</sup> There was another discrepancy that was not widely recognised. Using an average value of time to measure time savings, then were road users actually charged this amount roughly a half would not be willing to pay that amount, so income would halve - making it completely incompatible with the rail 'user pays' methodology.

<sup>7</sup> In principle, it would be possible for a road scheme that resulted in increased accident rates to have the highest benefit/cost ratio, if it also produced large travel time and vehicle operating cost savings – though it would be contrary to policy to implement such a scheme.